Learning Resources v. Trump

Chief Justice Roberts often emphasizes textualism and the separation of powers, which could lead him to scrutinize whether IEEPA's text explicitly grants tariff authority or if such power is inherently legislative. His concern for institutional balance might also weigh against an expansive interpretation of executive power.

Justice Thomas is a strong proponent of originalism and textualism, and he is likely to interpret IEEPA strictly based on its plain language at the time of its enactment, potentially finding that it does not encompass tariff authority. He often favors limiting executive power where not explicitly granted by statute or the Constitution.

Justice Alito generally favors a textualist approach and has often expressed skepticism about broad interpretations of executive authority, particularly when it encroaches on powers traditionally held by Congress. He would likely focus on whether the statute's language clearly permits the imposition of tariffs.

Justice Sotomayor often considers the practical implications of statutory interpretations and may look at the legislative history or congressional intent behind IEEPA. She might be open to a broader reading of executive power in emergency situations if supported by the statute's purpose, but also considers the impact on affected parties.

Justice Kagan often employs a pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation, considering both text and context, including legislative history and the statute's purpose. She might examine whether Congress intended IEEPA to provide broad flexibility to the President in economic emergencies, while also being mindful of potential overreach.

Justice Gorsuch is a firm textualist and originalist, and he is likely to interpret IEEPA's language narrowly, focusing on the precise words used and their meaning at the time of enactment. He often expresses concerns about the delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.

Justice Kavanaugh generally adheres to textualism and has shown a tendency to respect congressional intent as expressed in statutory language. He would likely examine whether the specific terms of IEEPA explicitly grant the President the power to impose tariffs, or if such an action falls outside its scope.

Justice Barrett is a textualist who emphasizes the plain meaning of statutory language. She would likely focus on whether the text of IEEPA, read in its ordinary sense, authorizes the President to impose tariffs, and may be wary of inferring powers not explicitly granted.

Justice Jackson often considers the practical effects of legal interpretations and may look to the broader context and purpose of a statute. She might consider the historical application of IEEPA and whether the current executive actions align with congressional intent, while also being attentive to the separation of powers.