Chevron USA v. Plaquemines Parish
No. 24-813 · October Term 2025 · Judicial Power · decided April 17, 2026
Decided: Chevron USA won 8-0. The model was right.
Expected vote 5–4 for Chevron USA. Chance of a unanimous ruling 42%. FantasySCOTUS crowd: 72% Chevron USA.
The case
Plaquemines Parish and other Louisiana entities are suing Chevron USA and other oil companies in state court, alleging environmental damage from oil and gas production, including activities dating back to World War II. The oil companies attempted to move these cases to federal court under a statute allowing federal jurisdiction for actions against persons "acting under" a U.S. officer "for or relating to any act under color of such office," citing their WWII-era contracts to supply the federal government with aviation gasoline. The Fifth Circuit agreed the companies were "acting under" a federal officer but split on whether their crude oil production was sufficiently "relating to" their federal contracts, with the majority requiring an explicit contractual directive for removal. The Supreme Court must now decide the proper interpretation of the "relating to" requirement in the federal-officer removal statute, specifically whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test applies after a 2011 amendment.
- Does the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute eliminate the need for a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test to establish federal jurisdiction?
- Can a federal contractor remove a case to federal court when sued for oil-production activities if those activities were undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract, even without explicit contractual directives for the production itself?
- The interpretation of "relating to" in the federal-officer removal statute will determine the scope of federal court jurisdiction over state-law claims against federal contractors.
- The Court's decision will clarify the balance between state and federal court authority in cases involving historical federal contracts and modern environmental claims.
AI brief written by gemini-2.5-flash from the questions presented and the Oyez facts on 2026-10-02. Commentary only; it is not an input to the model.
Question presented, as filed
This petition arises from Louisiana parishes' efforts to hold petitioners liable in state court for, inter alia , production of crude oil in the Louisiana coastal zone during World War II. Petitioners removed these cases from state court under 28 U.S.C. §1442 (a)(1), which as amended in 2011 provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against "any person acting under [an] officer" of the United States "for or relating to any act under color of such office." The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that petitioners satisfy the statute's "acting under" requirement by virtue of their WWII-era contracts to supply the federal government with high-octane aviation gasoline ("avgas"). But the panel divided on the "relating to" requirement, with the two-judge majority holding that petitioners' wartime production of crude oil was "unrelated" to their contractually required refinement of that same crude into avgas because the contracts did not contain any explicit "directive pertaining to [petitioners'] oil production activities." App.38. Judge Oldham dissented, explaining that the majority's approach reinstates a variant of the "causal nexus" requirement that multiple circuits (and the U.S. Congress) have expressly rejected. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 7 to 6. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute. 2. Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract.
Facts of the case (Oyez)
Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands. The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations. After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The nine
Each justice's predicted vote and the record behind it: how often they have voted for the petitioner overall, in Judicial Power cases, and when the lower court ruled liberal; and, once argued, how many questions they put to each side (the side a justice questions more tends to lose their vote). The note under each row is the AI brief's reading, commentary rather than model input.
| Justice | Predicted | Overall | This issue | Lower court liberal | At argument | Voted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
John G. Roberts Republican appointee · since OT2005 Chief Justice Roberts often emphasizes textualism and the plain meaning of statutory language; his vote may hinge on whether the 2011 amendment's text clearly abrogates prior judicial interpretations of the removal statute. | 59% Chevron USA | 68% for the petitioner · 1,512 votes | 69% Judicial Power · 197 votes | 77% lower court liberal · 730 votes | 15 / 5 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✓ |
Clarence Thomas Republican appointee · since OT1991 Justice Thomas is a strong proponent of originalism and textualism, and he may scrutinize the statutory language of the 2011 amendment to determine if it explicitly or implicitly rejects a causal-nexus requirement. | 56% Chevron USA | 59% for the petitioner · 2,801 votes | 57% Judicial Power · 388 votes | 77% lower court liberal · 1,344 votes | 4 / 2 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✓ |
Samuel A. Alito Republican appointee · since OT2005 Justice Alito will not continue to participate in this case. | 56% Chevron USA | 62% for the petitioner · 1,469 votes | 65% Judicial Power · 190 votes | 79% lower court liberal · 699 votes | silent | not coded |
Sonia Sotomayor Democratic appointee · since OT2009 Justice Sotomayor often considers the practical implications of statutory interpretations and may be inclined to uphold state court jurisdiction unless federal involvement is clearly and directly implicated by the statute's text. | 50% Chevron USA | 61% for the petitioner · 1,192 votes | 58% Judicial Power · 149 votes | 48% lower court liberal · 560 votes | 10 / 2 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✗ |
Elena Kagan Democratic appointee · since OT2010 Justice Kagan frequently employs a pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation, considering legislative intent and the broader context of amendments; she may examine the legislative history of the 2011 amendment to discern Congress's purpose. | 50% Chevron USA | 63% for the petitioner · 1,072 votes | 61% Judicial Power · 137 votes | 51% lower court liberal · 495 votes | 11 / 3 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✗ |
Neil M. Gorsuch Republican appointee · since OT2016 Justice Gorsuch is a textualist who often emphasizes the clear meaning of statutory language and may be skeptical of judicial tests that add requirements not explicitly found in the text of the federal-officer removal statute. | 59% Chevron USA | 65% for the petitioner · 592 votes | 69% Judicial Power · 83 votes | 75% lower court liberal · 278 votes | 14 / 7 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✓ |
Brett M. Kavanaugh Republican appointee · since OT2018 Justice Kavanaugh often favors clear statutory rules and may look for a straightforward interpretation of the 2011 amendment that provides a predictable standard for federal-officer removal. | 59% Chevron USA | 69% for the petitioner · 498 votes | 73% Judicial Power · 62 votes | 77% lower court liberal · 235 votes | 7 / 1 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✓ |
Amy Coney Barrett Republican appointee · since OT2020 Justice Barrett is a textualist who prioritizes the ordinary meaning of statutory language; her analysis will likely focus on whether the phrase "for or relating to any act under color of such office" in the amended statute supports a broad or narrow interpretation of removal. | 59% Chevron USA | 66% for the petitioner · 360 votes | 71% Judicial Power · 49 votes | 76% lower court liberal · 168 votes | 8 / 6 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✓ |
Ketanji Brown Jackson Democratic appointee · since OT2022 Justice Jackson often considers the historical context and purpose of statutes, and her analysis may explore how the 2011 amendment was intended to change the scope of federal-officer removal, particularly concerning the "relating to" clause. | 56% Chevron USA | 59% for the petitioner · 244 votes | 60% Judicial Power · 37 votes | 38% lower court liberal · 108 votes | 16 / 5 questions at Chevron / Plaquemines | Chevron USA ✓ |
Rates are each justice's own participation record in the Supreme Court Database, the same history the model trains on; a rate on fewer than five votes is not shown. The predicted vote is VotePredictor SCOTUS' per-justice probability from the served model, which also reads the bench-wide transcript signal and how long each side held the podium.
Every call this term, justice by justice · how the model is built and its record. Data as of 2026-10-02.