Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia
No. 25-352 · October Term 2026 · Judicial Power · argument November 2, 2026
Expected vote 5–4 for Younge. Chance of a unanimous ruling 43%.
Before oral argument the model knows only the case's structure: the issue area, which way the lower court ruled, and each justice's record on both. That is not enough to separate cases, so every unargued case carries the petitioner's base rate. The transcript features arrive within days of argument and the number becomes a call.
The case
Jasmine Younge is suing the Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office for pregnancy discrimination after she was fired shortly after announcing her pregnancy. The lower courts allowed the DA's Office to raise a new affirmative defense, the Title VII personal-staff exemption, for the first time at summary judgment, and granted summary judgment on that basis. The Supreme Court must now decide whether a defendant can assert an unpleaded affirmative defense at summary judgment, especially if amending the answer to include it would be barred.
- Does Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires pleading affirmative defenses, permit a defendant to raise an unpleaded affirmative defense for the first time at summary judgment?
- What is the interplay between Rule 8(c)(1) and Rule 16(b)(4) regarding amendments to pleadings, and can a defendant assert an affirmative defense at summary judgment if an amendment to plead it would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)?
- How should courts balance the procedural requirements of pleading with the goal of reaching the merits of a case, particularly when a new defense emerges late in litigation?
- What constitutes 'prejudice' to the opposing party when an affirmative defense is raised late, and how should that factor into a court's decision to allow or disallow the defense?
AI brief written by gemini-2.5-flash from the questions presented and the Oyez facts on 2026-10-02. Commentary only; it is not an input to the model.
Question presented, as filed
Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party "must" plead "any" affirmative defense. The question presented is: Where a defendant has filed an answer without pleading an affirmative defense, may the defendant nonetheless assert that affirmative defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion, without amending or seeking to amend its answer to plead that affirmative defense, and may a defendant do so even if an amendment adding that affirmative defense would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)?
Facts of the case (Oyez)
In April 2019, Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard — an elected official — hired Dr. Jasmine Younge as Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs at a salary of $120,282. Younge ranked third in the office's chain of command, reported exclusively to Howard, supervised more than thirty employees, and worked so closely with Howard that he described her as a "key member" and his "go-to person for almost everything." About two months into her tenure, Younge told Howard she was pregnant. After that announcement, Howard stopped meeting with Younge, excluded her from meetings, treated her dismissively, and reassigned some of her duties — then fired her two weeks later. Younge sued the Fulton County District Attorney's Office for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. In its answer, the DA's Office raised several affirmative defenses but did not plead the Title VII personal-staff exemption — which excludes from Title VII's coverage persons chosen to serve on an elected official's "personal staff." The DA's Office did not recognize the exemption as relevant until it began preparing its summary judgment motion, after discovery had already closed. The district court allowed the DA's Office to raise the personal-staff exemption for the first time at summary judgment, finding no prejudice to Younge from the late assertion, and granted summary judgment to the DA's Office on that basis; Younge then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed.
The nine
Each justice's predicted vote and the record behind it: how often they have voted for the petitioner overall, in Judicial Power cases, and when the lower court ruled conservative; and, once argued, how many questions they put to each side (the side a justice questions more tends to lose their vote). The note under each row is the AI brief's reading, commentary rather than model input.
| Justice | Predicted | Overall | This issue | Lower court conservative | At argument |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
John G. Roberts Republican appointee · since OT2005 Chief Justice Roberts often emphasizes the importance of clear procedural rules and their consistent application, which could lead him to scrutinize the late introduction of an affirmative defense. However, he also values judicial efficiency and avoiding unnecessary litigation, which might weigh against requiring a strict adherence to pleading rules if no prejudice is shown. | 57% Younge | 68% for the petitioner · 1,512 votes | 69% Judicial Power · 197 votes | 61% lower court conservative · 734 votes | not yet argued |
Clarence Thomas Republican appointee · since OT1991 Justice Thomas generally favors a strict textualist approach to interpreting rules and statutes, which could lead him to emphasize the mandatory language of Rule 8(c)(1) that a party 'must' plead 'any' affirmative defense. No clear read from the record. | 57% Younge | 59% for the petitioner · 2,801 votes | 57% Judicial Power · 388 votes | 43% lower court conservative · 1,365 votes | not yet argued |
Samuel A. Alito Republican appointee · since OT2005 Justice Alito often prioritizes the substantive rights of parties and may be inclined to allow a defense to be heard on its merits if there's no clear showing of prejudice to the opposing party. No clear read from the record. | 57% Younge | 62% for the petitioner · 1,469 votes | 65% Judicial Power · 190 votes | 48% lower court conservative · 722 votes | not yet argued |
Sonia Sotomayor Democratic appointee · since OT2009 Justice Sotomayor often considers the practical impact of procedural rules on litigants, particularly those who may be disadvantaged by technicalities. She might be concerned about the fairness to the petitioner if a crucial defense is sprung late in the litigation. No clear read from the record. | 57% Younge | 61% for the petitioner · 1,192 votes | 58% Judicial Power · 149 votes | 76% lower court conservative · 594 votes | not yet argued |
Elena Kagan Democratic appointee · since OT2010 Justice Kagan often takes a pragmatic approach to procedural rules, balancing their plain meaning with their underlying purpose and practical consequences. She may consider whether the late assertion of the defense genuinely prejudiced the petitioner or if it was a mere technical oversight. No clear read from the record. | 63% Younge | 63% for the petitioner · 1,072 votes | 61% Judicial Power · 137 votes | 75% lower court conservative · 543 votes | not yet argued |
Neil M. Gorsuch Republican appointee · since OT2016 Justice Gorsuch is a textualist who would likely focus on the plain language of Rule 8(c)(1) and Rule 16(b)(4). His jurisprudence often emphasizes adherence to the written law, which could lead him to question the allowance of an unpleaded defense. No clear read from the record. | 63% Younge | 65% for the petitioner · 592 votes | 69% Judicial Power · 83 votes | 59% lower court conservative · 286 votes | not yet argued |
Brett M. Kavanaugh Republican appointee · since OT2018 Justice Kavanaugh often seeks to apply rules in a way that promotes fairness and predictability in litigation. He might consider whether allowing the late defense undermines the notice function of pleadings or if it was a reasonable accommodation given the circumstances. No clear read from the record. | 57% Younge | 69% for the petitioner · 498 votes | 73% Judicial Power · 62 votes | 62% lower court conservative · 244 votes | not yet argued |
Amy Coney Barrett Republican appointee · since OT2020 Justice Barrett often emphasizes the importance of clear rules and their consistent application in civil procedure. She may carefully examine the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine if the lower court's action was permissible. No clear read from the record. | 57% Younge | 66% for the petitioner · 360 votes | 71% Judicial Power · 49 votes | 60% lower court conservative · 178 votes | not yet argued |
Ketanji Brown Jackson Democratic appointee · since OT2022 Justice Jackson often considers the practical implications of procedural rules and their impact on access to justice. She might be particularly sensitive to arguments about prejudice to the petitioner from a late-raised defense, especially in an employment discrimination case. No clear read from the record. | 63% Younge | 59% for the petitioner · 244 votes | 60% Judicial Power · 37 votes | 80% lower court conservative · 127 votes | not yet argued |
Rates are each justice's own participation record in the Supreme Court Database, the same history the model trains on; a rate on fewer than five votes is not shown. The predicted vote is VotePredictor SCOTUS' per-justice probability from the served model, which also reads the bench-wide transcript signal and how long each side held the podium.
Every call this term, justice by justice · how the model is built and its record. Data as of 2026-10-02.