Grand v. City of University Heights
No. 25-965 · October Term 2026 · First Amendment · argument December 9, 2026
Expected vote 6–3 for Grand. Chance of a unanimous ruling 46%.
Before oral argument the model knows only the case's structure: the issue area, which way the lower court ruled, and each justice's record on both. That is not enough to separate cases, so every unargued case carries the petitioner's base rate. The transcript features arrive within days of argument and the number becomes a call.
The case
Daniel Grand, an Orthodox Jewish man, is suing the City of University Heights, Ohio, alleging that the city's actions, including a cease-and-desist order and public pronouncements, chilled his First Amendment rights to religious exercise, speech, and assembly. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Grand's claims, finding them unripe due to the lack of a final land-use decision. The Supreme Court must now determine whether the First Amendment's chilling-effect doctrine is displaced by the land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff claims government threats deterred religious exercise both before and after a planning commission meeting.
- Does the First Amendment's chilling-effect doctrine apply independently, or is it superseded by the land-use finality requirement from Williamson County when a plaintiff alleges that government threats deterred religious exercise?
- What constitutes a 'final land-use decision' for ripeness purposes, and did the city's actions, including the cease-and-desist order and subsequent public warnings, amount to such a decision or an independent constitutional injury?
- How do RLUIPA claims interact with First Amendment chilling-effect claims in the context of land-use disputes, particularly regarding ripeness requirements?
- To what extent can a municipality's actions, short of a formal denial of a permit, be considered a credible threat that chills fundamental rights?
AI brief written by gemini-2.5-flash from the questions presented and the Oyez facts on 2026-10-02. Commentary only; it is not an input to the model.
Question presented, as filed
Whether the First Amendment's established chilling-effect doctrine-under which a credible government threat that deters the exercise of fundamental rights constitutes a complete and independently actionable constitutional injury-is displaced by Williamson Cnty .'s land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government threats both before and after a Planning Commission meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and assembly.
Facts of the case (Oyez)
Daniel Grand, an observant Orthodox Jew, purchased a home in University Heights, Ohio in 2019. Because Orthodox Jewish practice prohibits driving on the Sabbath and High Holidays, Grand could not easily travel to nearby synagogues. His faith also requires adult males to pray in a minyan, a quorum of at least ten adult males. In January 2021, Grand emailed roughly a dozen community members proposing to host a minyan in a single room of his home on the Sabbath and High Holidays. The gatherings would involve no structural changes, no signage, no amplification, and no traffic, since participants would walk. A neighbor complained to Mayor Michael Dylan Brennan, who immediately contacted City Law Director Luke McConville. Within hours, McConville issued a cease-and-desist order (CADO) directing Grand to stop using his home as a place of religious assembly or as a synagogue without first obtaining a special use permit (SUP). The CADO threatened building code citations and additional legal remedies for non-compliance, defined neither “shul” nor “place of religious assembly,” set no maximum number of permissible attendees, and provided no procedure to stay its effect pending review. Grand applied for an SUP, but the City unexpectedly converted the hearing to a “quasi-judicial” format—apparently for the first time in city history—which locked the evidentiary record at the outset and blocked Grand from submitting additional materials. Facing this hostile process and unable to supplement his application, Grand withdrew it. Mayor Brennan then issued a public pronouncement warning that any activities “consistent with” those of a house of worship still required an SUP, that the City had previously sued and obtained a permanent injunction against another home-based Jewish prayer group, and that neighbors should report any suspicious activity at Grand's address for enforcement. Grand sued the City of University Heights and several officials in the district court, asserting First Amendment free exercise, free speech, and assembly violations, along with RLUIPA and due process claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the core constitutional and RLUIPA claims without prejudice for lack of ripeness, concluding that no final land-use decision existed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Grand had “misapprehended” the nature of the CADO and that his claims remained unripe absent a final determination from the planning commission, without separately analyzing whether the CADO and Mayor Brennan’s post-withdrawal pronouncement independently chilled Grand’s First Amendment rights.
The nine
Each justice's predicted vote and the record behind it: how often they have voted for the petitioner overall, in First Amendment cases, and when the lower court ruled conservative; and, once argued, how many questions they put to each side (the side a justice questions more tends to lose their vote). The note under each row is the AI brief's reading, commentary rather than model input.
| Justice | Predicted | Overall | This issue | Lower court conservative | At argument |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
John G. Roberts Republican appointee · since OT2005 Chief Justice Roberts often emphasizes judicial restraint and the importance of established legal doctrines, which could lead him to consider whether the chilling-effect doctrine should be given its full weight independent of ripeness concerns in this context. | 68% Grand | 68% for the petitioner · 1,512 votes | 75% First Amendment · 83 votes | 61% lower court conservative · 734 votes | not yet argued |
Clarence Thomas Republican appointee · since OT1991 Justice Thomas generally favors a robust interpretation of individual liberties, particularly religious freedom, and may be inclined to view government actions that deter religious exercise with skepticism, potentially supporting a broader application of the chilling-effect doctrine. | 63% Grand | 59% for the petitioner · 2,801 votes | 69% First Amendment · 163 votes | 43% lower court conservative · 1,365 votes | not yet argued |
Samuel A. Alito Republican appointee · since OT2005 Justice Alito is a strong proponent of religious liberty and has consistently voted to protect free exercise rights, making him likely to scrutinize government actions that could be seen as infringing on religious practice, even if those actions do not involve a final permit denial. | 66% Grand | 62% for the petitioner · 1,469 votes | 77% First Amendment · 79 votes | 48% lower court conservative · 722 votes | not yet argued |
Sonia Sotomayor Democratic appointee · since OT2009 Justice Sotomayor often considers the practical impact of government actions on individuals and communities, and she may be sensitive to how the city's actions, including the 'quasi-judicial' hearing and public warnings, could disproportionately affect religious minorities. | 68% Grand | 61% for the petitioner · 1,192 votes | 48% First Amendment · 69 votes | 76% lower court conservative · 594 votes | not yet argued |
Elena Kagan Democratic appointee · since OT2010 Justice Kagan often seeks to balance competing legal principles and may examine whether the chilling-effect doctrine can coexist with land-use ripeness requirements without undermining either, potentially looking for a clear standard for when a threat constitutes an actionable injury. | 68% Grand | 63% for the petitioner · 1,072 votes | 63% First Amendment · 62 votes | 75% lower court conservative · 543 votes | not yet argued |
Neil M. Gorsuch Republican appointee · since OT2016 Justice Gorsuch frequently emphasizes textualism and originalism, and he may focus on the historical understanding of the First Amendment's protections against government overreach and the chilling of fundamental rights, potentially favoring a more expansive view of what constitutes an injury. | 66% Grand | 65% for the petitioner · 592 votes | 78% First Amendment · 37 votes | 59% lower court conservative · 286 votes | not yet argued |
Brett M. Kavanaugh Republican appointee · since OT2018 Justice Kavanaugh often seeks to apply clear legal rules and may consider whether the city's actions, particularly the cease-and-desist order and public pronouncements, created a sufficiently credible threat to trigger the chilling-effect doctrine, independent of the finality requirement. | 66% Grand | 69% for the petitioner · 498 votes | 79% First Amendment · 34 votes | 62% lower court conservative · 244 votes | not yet argued |
Amy Coney Barrett Republican appointee · since OT2020 Justice Barrett often approaches cases with a focus on original meaning and established legal principles, and she may consider whether the chilling-effect doctrine, as an established constitutional injury, should be applied without being displaced by a prudential ripeness doctrine in this context. | 68% Grand | 66% for the petitioner · 360 votes | 75% First Amendment · 24 votes | 60% lower court conservative · 178 votes | not yet argued |
Ketanji Brown Jackson Democratic appointee · since OT2022 Justice Jackson often considers the real-world implications of legal doctrines and may be attentive to how the city's actions impacted Grand's ability to exercise his religious freedom, potentially favoring an interpretation that protects against government overreach that chills fundamental rights. | 68% Grand | 59% for the petitioner · 244 votes | 67% First Amendment · 15 votes | 80% lower court conservative · 127 votes | not yet argued |
Rates are each justice's own participation record in the Supreme Court Database, the same history the model trains on; a rate on fewer than five votes is not shown. The predicted vote is VotePredictor SCOTUS' per-justice probability from the served model, which also reads the bench-wide transcript signal and how long each side held the podium.
Every call this term, justice by justice · how the model is built and its record. Data as of 2026-10-02.